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IMPLIED CONSENT TO SUMMARY JURISDICTION
IN BANKRUPTCY: THE FORGOTTEN RIGHT
TO JURY TRIAL
In sections 21 and 232 of the Bankruptcy Act, Congress has estab-
lished a jurisdictional scheme which distinguishes between controversies
"at law and equity" and "proceedings under this act." 3 The district courts,
denominated courts of bankruptcy, have jurisdiction over all proceedings
arising under the Bankruptcy Act.4 Controversies at law and equity be-
tween trustees and adverse claimants, on the other hand, may ordinarily
be brought only where the bankrupt might have brought suit if proceed-
ings in bankruptcy had not been instituted. Exceptions are provided where
the defendant consents or where the issue in controversy falls within sec-
tions 60, 67 or 70 of the actY
In addition to establishing this jurisdictional scheme Congress has also
provided for both plenary and summary proceedings.6 A summary pro-
ceeding differs from a plenary proceeding in the following respects:
The former is based upon petition and proceeds without formal
pleadings; the latter proceeds upon formal pleadings. In the
former, the necessary parties are cited in by order to show cause;
in the latter, formal summons brings in the parties other than
the plaintiff. In the former, short time notice of hearing is fixed
by the court; in the latter, time for pleading and hearing is fixed
by statute or rule of court. In the former, the hearing is quite
IBankruptcy Act § 2(a), 52 Stat 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1964), provides:
The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy
are hereby created courts of bankruptcy and are hereby invested, within their
respective territorial limits as now established or as they may be hereafter
changed, with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act ....
2 Bankruptcy Act § 23, 52 Stat 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1964), provides:
a. The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies
at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings under this Act,
between receivers and trustees as such and adverse claimants, concerning
the property acquired or claimed by the receivers or trustees, in the same
manner and to the same extent as though such proceedings had not been
instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such
adverse claimants.
b. Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only
in the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them
if proceedings under this Act had not been instituted, unless by consent of
the defendant except as provided in sections 60, 67, and 70 of this Act
3 Compare Bankruptcy Act § 23(a), 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §46(a)
(1964), with Bankruptcy Act §2(a), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §11 (1964).
4 Bankruptcy Act § 2(a), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1964). For
the complete text of this section see note 1 supra.
5 Bankruptcy Act § 23, 52 Stat 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1964). For the
complete text of this section see note 3 supra.
6 See 2 Cou.sEa, BANRsUTCY 23.02 [1] (14th ed. 1964); MAcLAciaLAx, BANK-
RUPrcY § 193 (1956).
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generally upon affidavits; in the latter, examination of witnesses
is the usual method. In the former, the hearing is sometimes
ex parte; in the latter, a full hearing is had.
7
In addition, there is a right to jury trial in plenary proceedings in accord
with usual common law rules, while no such right is afforded in summary
proceedings. 8 The type of proceeding applicable in any given adjudication
usually depends upon whether the trustee or the claimant has actual or
constructive possession of the property in question.9
When a creditor files a claim, the bankruptcy court will ordinarily
have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of his claim in a summary
manner, since it has possession of the bankrupt's property. However, a
problem arises if the trustee files a counterclaim against the creditor in the
same proceeding. In this situation, the bankruptcy court ordinarily does
not have actual or constructive possession of the property which the trus-
tee is claiming. Thus, if the trustee had pursued his claim as an original
action rather than as a counterclaim, he would have had to sue where the
bankrupt could have sued had there been no bankruptcy and the defend-
ant would have been entitled to a plenary proceeding. Creditors, it should
be noted, prefer this result and would like to have the trustee's counterclaim
similarly adjudicated by a plenary proceeding and a jury trial on the
issues.10 The majority of the circuit courts, however, have held that the
trustee's counterclaim may be adjudicated in a summary proceeding if it
is related to the creditor's original claim.' Their reasoning has been that
by filing his claim the creditor has impliedly consented to the bankruptcy
court's summary jurisdiction, and that a subsequent objection to summary
proceedings on the counterclaim will be ineffective.
This Comment will examine the consent doctrine as it has been estab-
lished in the federal courts, focusing upon the extent to which an implied
consent rationale should determine whether a proceeding is summary or
plenary. An attempt will be made to demonstrate the severability of
7 Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.
1932) ; see Cofrer, op. cit. supra note 6, 1 23.02[2].
8 MACLACHLIAN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 193.
9 In proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Act, the district courts, sitting as
courts of bankruptcy, have jurisdiction to adjudicate certain enumerated controversies
by way of summary proceedings. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a) (1)-(22), 52 Stat. 842
(1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1)-(21) (1964).
10 See, e.g., Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955),
cert. dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944 (1956).
11 Katchen v. Landy, 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 380 U.S. 971
(1965); Powell v. Maher, 307 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 910 (1962) ; Peters v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Continental Cas.
Co. v. White, 269 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1959) ; In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327
(3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953) ; Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784
(4th Cir. 1938) ; see In the Matter of Majestic Radio & Television Corp., 227 F.2d
152 (7th Cir. 1955) (dictum), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 995 (1956); Inter-State Nat'l
Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 350
U.S. 944 (1956); cf. Chase Natl Bank v. Lyford, 147 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1945).
Contra, B. F. Avery & Sons v. Davis, 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 945 (1952).
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the concept of consent to jurisdiction from that of consent to a particular
mode of proceeding. The discussion will be concerned with the counter-
claim situation, since the present formulation of the consent doctrine has its
greatest effect there by depriving the claimant of a jury trial on the issues
presented by the counterclaim.
Constructing a Doctrine
Alexander v. Hillwan,12 a 1935 Supreme Court decision, provided the
foundation on which the circuit courts erected their consent by filing
doctrine. The Hillman case was a receivership proceeding in which certain
officers and directors of the corporation in receivership filed claims with
the special master for unpaid salaries and other expenses. The receiver
subsequently filed an ancillary bill of complaint against these claimants,
alleging that they had mismanaged the corporation funds and had obtained
the bankrupt's property fraudulently. In affirming the lower court decision,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to award affirmative relief on the counterclaim filed by the
receiver.13 Since the claimant was not in a court of his own choosing,' 4
the court reasoned, no consent to be sued by way of counterclaim could be
implied from his filing of a claim. Furthermore, even though the creditor
waived any right to jury trial on his claim by filing it in a court of equity,
he did not thereby waive that right for a counterclaim involving an action
at law.15 Although the Supreme Court reversed, it did not pass upon the
jury trial issue, since it decided the case on the following basis:
Causes of action arising from transgressions of officers and di-
rectors of corporations such as those on which the receivers rest
their counterclaims are cognizable in equity for the reason that
the receivers have no adequate remedy at law and also because
respondents, as it is alleged, fraudulently obtained defendant's
property and therefore cannot in equity and good conscience
retain it.
1 6
The Constitution protects the right to jury trial only insofar as it
existed at common law.1 7 Since the right had never attached to equitable
causes of action, the jury trial issue disappeared from Hillman when the
counterclaim was classified as an equitable one. From the facts of the
Supreme Court opinion, the strongest holding that can be gleaned from
12296 U.S. 222 (1935).
18Alexander v. Hillman, 75 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1935).
14 Id. at 455.
15 Ibid.
16Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 240 (1935). (Emphasis added.)
17 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."
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Hillnan is that when a claim is filed in an equity receivership, the equity
court can adjudicate counterclaims which were cognizable in equity.",
The circuit courts, however, did not so limit their holdings. Three years
after Hillman, the Fourth Circuit held that when the trustee's counterclaim
arises out of the same transaction as the creditor's claim, the bankruptcy
court can grant affirmative relief against the creditor in the summary
proceeding. 19 The court did not attempt to classify the counterclaim as
legal or equitable, nor did it discuss the jury trial issue. It chose instead
simply to rest its decision on Hillman, without any discussion of the factual
differences between the two cases. This version of the consent doctrine
then spread through most of the circuits in a pyramid process, each new
court citing Hillman and the other circuit court decisions purporting to
follow it. At one point, the Tenth Circuit even extended the scope of
summary jurisdiction to unrelated counterclaims 20 The right to jury trial
on legal counterclaims went unmentioned in most of the decisions, and only
the dissenting opinions in Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther 2 1 and Katchen
v. Landy 22 gave consideration to this issue.
In devising their consent doctrine, the circuit courts have failed to
separate three related concepts. To begin with, the initial filing of a
creditor's claim has been taken to imply not only consent to the court's
jurisdiction, but also consent to summary proceedings. The courts have
not only confused these two concepts, but have also neglected to give
separate consideration to the jury trial question. In implying consent to
jurisdiction, no distinction has been drawn between the consent needed
to give a court power to adjudicate a controversy and the consent necessary
to constitute a claimant's waiver of jury trial. The latter has been viewed
as an inevitable consequence of the former. The courts' implication of
the waiver of jury trial from consent to jurisdiction is the most difficult
aspect of their thinking to rationalize and will be dealt with at length.
Consent to Jurisdiction Equated to Consent to Summary Proceedings
At first glance, the relevance of the courts' failure to distinguish
consent to jurisdiction from consent to summary proceedings may be ques-
tioned. Other than the absence of jury trial there is little practical differ-
ence between plenary and summary proceedings2 However, if it can be
Is For a similar analysis of the Supreme Court opinion see In re Nathan, 98
F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
19 Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1938).
20 Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dis-
nmissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944 (1956). In a recent case, however, it has retreated
somewhat from that position. Katchen v. Landy, 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964),
cert. granted, 380 U.S. 971 (1965).
21221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944
(1956).
22336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 380 U.S. 971 (1965).
23 See text accompanying note 7 supra. See generally MACLACHLAN, op. cit. supra
note 6, § 193.
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shown that a creditor's filing of a claim should not be taken as implying
consent even to the less important aspects of summary proceedings, it
would follow logically that it should not be considered as a waiver of
the seventh amendment right to jury trial. It is in this framework that the
consent to summary proceedings issue assumes its real significance.
The argument most often advanced for permitting the adjudication
of related counterclaims in summary proceedings is that such a course will
help achieve speed and economy in bankruptcy litigation. 4 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are often cited in support of this approach, since
one of their basic purposes is the resolution of as many issues as possible
in a single proceeding. The courts have also argued that since the trustee
can have a summary adjudication of the issues upon which his counter-
claim depends by raising these issues in answer to the claim, there is no
reason for compelling him to institute a plenary action to obtain affirmative
relief, since the issues adjudicated as defenses would be res judicata in a
plenary suit 2 5
Although settling all issues in one adjudication is both a desirable
goal and one of the directives of the Federal Rules, this policy should not
be applied in the bankruptcy context, since Congress has explicitly pro-
vided for different types of proceedings. In other words, it seems difficult
to base decisions on an economy of litigation rationale when the governing
statute requires that certain issues be adjudicated in a summary manner
while others be resolved in plenary proceedings.2 6
The res judicata-more precisely, collateral estoppel-rationale also
seems questionable. A threshold problem is whether the courts have been
correct in holding that the issues adjudicated as defenses in a summary
proceeding would be res judicata in a plenary suit.27  Where a court has
limited subject matter jurisdiction, the collateral effect of its resolution of
certain issues is also limited. Thus, if a court incidentally decides an
issue which it would not have had jurisdiction to decide in a direct action,
its decisions will only be conclusive for purposes of that particular case.28
They "will not be conclusive between the parties in a later suit brought
.. for the purpose of determining the matter directly in a court which
24 See, e.g., Peters v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960).
25 E.g., it re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied ub
mom., Marine Midland Trust Co. v. McGirl, 345 U.S. 940 (1953).
28 See Taubel-Scott-Iitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1924) : "[I]n
no case where it lacked possession, could the bankruptcy court, under the law as
originally enacted, nor can it now (without consent) adjudicate in a summary pro-
ceeding the validity of a substantial adverse claim." Id. at 433.
27 The courts have not questioned the applicability of the res judicata rationale,
but merely have assumed that it applied in the bankruptcy context. See, e.g., In re
Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied sub noa., Marine Mid-
land Trust Co. v. McGirl, 345 U.S. 940 (1953); Schwartz v. Levine & Malin, Inc.,
111 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1940).
2 8
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71 (1942).
1965] IMPLIED CONSENT TO SUMMARY JURISDICTION 261
has jurisdiction to determine it directly." 2 The situation in which a
trustee defends against a creditor's claim by alleging that the creditor had
received a voidable preference may be used to show how this concept
applies in the bankruptcy context. If the trustee had sued directly to
recover the preference, the bankruptcy court normally would not have had
summary jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue?0 Since the trustee raised
the issue only as a defense to the creditor's claim, however, the bankruptcy
court would have summary jurisdiction to adjudicate its merits, for such a
determination would be necessary to decide the validity of the creditor's
claim, which admittedly is within its jurisdiction. Under the rule stated
above, however, such a decision of the bankruptcy court would not be
conclusive in a later action initiated by the trustee in a court having direct
jurisdiction to determine the preference issue. Thus, the circuit courts'
rationale for allowing the trustee to recover an affirmative judgment in the
summary proceeding may not be required by the collateral estoppel doctrine.
Even if collateral estoppel were technically applicable in the bank-
ruptcy context, it is still possible to question whether the doctrine should
be applied. As one commentator has stated:
Res judicata, or more properly, collateral estoppel, is not an abso-
lute imperative of the law. Res judicata represents a policy which,
like other doctrines of the law, must be weighed and balanced
when in conflict with competing policies?1
A close analysis of the Bankruptcy Act reveals that Congress has clearly
articulated a competing policy by its careful distinction between summary
and plenary proceedings. Since Congress, in establishing a complete sys-
tem for bankruptcy administration, "deliberately struck a balance between
summary and plenary proceedings [such] . . . balance ought not be
lightly disregarded simply because a court might (perhaps rightly) believe
the policy unwise." 32
While there has been little criticism of the rationales employed by
the circuit courts, it is noteworthy that even Professor Moore, while sup-
porting the collateral estoppel theory and favoring the summary adjudica-
tion of counterclaims, still is unwilling to have this procedure employed
in every case. He states that:
29 Id., comment a. See Developments in the Law--Res Judicata, 65 HAv. L.
R-v. 818, 849 (1952) : "If the court of limited jurisdiction involved is a small claims
court, its judgment obviously will not be given collateral effect because its purpose
of giving 'quick justice' on the immediate issue requires it to hold only summary
proceedings"'
30 This hypothetical assumes that the trustee does not have actual or constructive
possession of the property he is seeking to recover. The bankruptcy court thus would
not have summary jurisdiction.
a1 Ferguson, The Consetwial Basis of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Matters of
Bankruptcy: Fact and Fiction, 14 RuTGERs L. REv. 491, 515 (1960).
82 Ibid.
262 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
When the objections to summary jurisdiction [on a counterclaim]
in a particular case are sufficiently impelling, the bankruptcy court,
as a court of equity and in the exercise of a sound discretion,
should stay its hand and remit the trustee to a plenary suit.m
Though this reservation is hardly an indictment of the circuit court doctrine,
it does demonstrate that the congressional distinction between plenary
and summary proceedings should not go completely unnoticed in an effort
to achieve more efficient bankruptcy administration.
The "consent by filing" doctrine is further weakened by an exami-
nation of the Bankruptcy Act itself. Section 23 (a) of the act states that
if a trustee claims property held by an adverse claimant, the federal court
will have jurisdiction "in the same manner and to the same extent as
though such [bankruptcy] proceedings had not been instituted and such
controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claim-
ants." 34 This section is concerned solely with the power of the court to
adjudicate a controversy. It does not speak to the nature of the proceed-
ings to be employed once jurisdiction is obtained. Section 23(b) of the
act similarly gives no indication that summary proceedings will be held in
the federal court, even if that court acquires jurisdiction by consent. That
section 315 states only that the trustee can bring a suit in a court where the
bankrupt could not have brought it if the defendant consents to the juris-
diction. Some courts have clearly recognized the separability of consent
to the power of a particular court to adjudicate a controversy from con-
sent to a particular mode of proceeding. 8 One court has stated that
"the consent mentioned in 23(b) means consent to the tribunal in which
the controversy is to be carried on, and not to the mode of procedure
. .. ." There is thus no reason implicit in section 23(b) why a
creditor can not recognize the power of the court to hear the counterclaim
without losing his right to have it heard in a plenary manner. The con-
cept of a separability of consent to jurisdiction from consent to summary
proceedings has been recognized in another court's statement that "the ob-
jection to summary procedure does not go to the basic jurisdiction of the
court but to its authority to proceed in a summary way." 
38
The separability of the jurisdictional issue from the nature of the
proceeding issue has been alluded to by the Supreme Court in MacDonald
v. Plymouth County Trust Co.39 In that case the trustee filed a petition
33 Moore, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE L.J. 1,
38 (1958).
34 For the complete text of this section of the Bankruptcy Act, see note 2 siupra.
35 Ibid.
6 See In re Prima Co., 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1938).
37 Sinsheimer v. Simonson, 107 Fed. 898, 906 (6th Cir. 1901), aff'd sub 1tom.,
Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U.S. 18 (1902).
'8 First Nat'l Bank v. Fox, 111 F.2d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 1940).
39 286 U.S. 263 (1932).
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with the referee to set aside preferences alleged to be voidable within the
meaning of section 60(b). The respondent agreed in open court to let
the trial of the issues proceed before the referee, and the only question
before the court was whether the referee had jurisdiction to determine
the issue in a summary proceeding after the parties had consented. The
Court concluded that a summary proceeding could be held, since the right
to a plenary proceeding could be waived and was so waived by the claim-
ant's consent in open court. However, the court went on to state that:
Where a suit by the trustee is plenary in character . . . both
parties to it are entitled to claim the benefits of the procedure
in a plenary suit, not available in the summary method of pro-
cedure . . . . A denial of those benefits would be in effect a
denial of the right to a plenary suit, to which both parties are
entitled .... 40
Thus neither the Bankruptcy Act nor the cases seem to afford the circuit
courts a basis for implying consent to summary proceedings when a creditor
files a claim.
In constructing the "consent by filing" doctrine, the circuit courts
have given no weight to the fact that the creditor is forced to come to
the bankruptcy court with its summary proceedings to present his original
claim. The courts have simply reasoned that since a person beginning
litigation ordinarily must face counterclaims made by the defendant, all
claimants in bankruptcy should come to court prepared to adjudicate every-
thing related to their claim. This approach is unpersuasive since it does
not allow for the different type of proceeding which the claimant must
enter in bankruptcy litigation to receive his share of the bankrupt's assets.
Its effect has been to deprive a creditor who wishes to file a claim of the
opportunity to appear specially. If the creditor makes a claim, he is
considered to have made a general appearance, even though he may have
no way of telling whether a counterclaim will be brought against him.
This result is not in any way irrational, but it is difficult to understand
why this particular class of litigants should not be allowed to make special
appearances. Indeed, since the bankruptcy proceeding is an unusual one,
and since Congress has carefully distinguished between summary and
plenary proceedings, the special appearance technique would seem par-
ticularly appropriate in the bankruptcy field. The concept of quasi in rent
jurisdiction demonstrates the acceptability of limited appearances in our
system, and also establishes a framework for handling atypical situations
which could guide the bankruptcy courts.
A court having quasi in rem jurisdiction cannot give judgment for
more than the value of the property attached; 41 in some states this rule
40 Id. at 266-67.
41 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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applies even when the defendant comes to court.4 Such a procedure
allows the defendant to litigate the merits without making a general appear-
ance. The defendant in the quasi in rein suit occupies a position analogous
to that of the claimant in a bankruptcy proceeding, for if the defendant
does not appear, a default judgment may be rendered against him,4 while
if the creditor fails to file his claim, he has no alternative way of collect-
ing.44  Another conceptual similarity between quasi in rem jurisdiction
and limited appearance in bankruptcy is that the jurisdiction in both is based
on the court's actual or constructive possession of certain property.45 Al-
though the analogy is by no means perfect, it does demonstrate that our
system is not antagonistic to the concept of permitting a litigant to enter
a particular forum free from an implication of consent to the tribunal's
jurisdiction for all purposes.
In a 1932 decision, the Supreme Court indicated that a limited appear-
ance is available in bankruptcy. The claimant in Daniel v. Guaranty
Trust Co.4 ' petitioned for reclamation of bonds held by the trustee. The
trustee defended on this issue and also alleged that the claimant held
money which belonged to the bankrupt. The referee ordered the trustee
to give the bonds to the claimant and ordered the claimant to turn over
the money to the trustee. On these facts, the Supreme Court held that
the claimant did not enter a general appearance by filing its petition for
reclamation and that it did not submit itself to summary proceedings on
unrelated counterclaims. 47 The Court added that the demand for speedy
administration of bankrupt estates is not enough to justify such a radical
departure from the ordinary procedure.48 Since it does not reach the ques-
42 See, e.g., Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214
(6th Cir. 1922); Cheshire Natl Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
For a contrary result see United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957), in which the court held that the defendant's
appearance to defend on the merits gave the court power to render a judgment in
personam. One line of reasoning employed by the court to reach its decision was
that the "parties cannot complain of inconvenience, since they have come into the
jurisdiction." 236 F.2d at 302. However, as stated by one commentator, "this argu-
ment overlooks the fact that the defendant's participation is his only means of pro-
tecting his property and bears no relation to the convenience of the forum." De-
velopments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 953 (1960).
Another rationale used by the court was that a rule against personal jurisdiction
would only produce further litigation whose merits would be determined by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. This collateral estoppel argument, however, may not
be applicable in the bankruptcy context. See text accompanying notes 27-32 mtpra.
Thus, those courts which prohibit limited appearances in quasi in rein actions hardly
seem to provide any basis for denying limited appearances in bankruptcy proceedings.
48 Note, 97 U. PA. L. Rxv. 403 (1949).
44 Bankruptcy Act § 57(n), 52 Stat. 867 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(m) (1964).
45 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE: 38.30[3] (2d ed. 1951).
46285 U.S. 154 (1932).
4 7 The risk incidental to a general appearance and consent to adjudication of
claims of all kinds might easily deter where the right to recover is clear.
Moreover, the choice would not be between tribunals merely, but between
the ordinary processes in a plenary suit and a summary hearing.
Id. at 162.
48 Ibid.
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tion of related counterclaims, Daniel does not settle the present problem.
It does, however, erect a limit to the court's power to imply consent
49
and is persuasive authority for requiring a court to articulate carefully
its reasons for making such an implication in the related counterclaim
situation. Furthermore, reasoning from the Daniel opinion, it would
appear that the creditor should be protected from litigating even related
counterclaims summarily. The only reason the Court allowed a special
appearance in Daniel was that the trustee would have had to employ
plenary proceedings if the creditor had not filed its claim. This is true,
of course, whether the counterclaim is related or unrelated to the creditor's
original claim.
The Implication of Waiver of Jury Trial
There is no doubt that the procedure currently employed by the
courts is a quite expeditious method for handling bankruptcy problems.
Were it not for one important difference between summary and plenary
proceedings, the present judicial policy would probably be the most advis-
able, even in face of the objections that have been raised above. That
difference, of course, is the right to jury trial in the plenary proceeding.50
The seventh amendment provides that "in suits at common law . . . the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved ... " The Supreme Court has
interpreted "common law" to include
not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old
and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where
equitable rights alone were recognized . . . . In a just sense,
the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits,
which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may
be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal
rights.51
The implication of waiver of this constitutional right must rest upon
more substantial grounds than the desire to have more efficient bankruptcy
administration. The circuit courts, however, have refused to accept this
conclusion, cavalierly assuming that a claimant waives his right to jury
trial on a legal counterclaim merely by filing his original claim. The
assertion of one court is typical:
49 Compare Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 285 U.S. 154 (1932), with Inter-State
Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed per Stipulation,
350 U.S. 944 (1956).
50 See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
51 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 433, 447 (1830) (Story, J.); see
Geneux v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 98 F. Supp. 405, 409 (W.D. La. 1951) and cases cited
therein for the present acceptability of this interpretation.
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To the contention that the Bank was denied the right to a jury
trial, it need only be said that if, as we have held, the Bank im-
pliedly consented to the summary jurisdiction of the court, it
thereby pro tanto waived its right to a jury trial on the issues in-
volved in the claim and counterclaim .... 52
Closer analysis, however, suggests that two different types or degrees of
consent are necessary to permit a court to find both jurisdiction and
waiver of jury trial.
In implying waiver of jury trial the courts have relied heavily upon
the equitable nature of the bankruptcy proceedings and the power of a
court of equity to require the claimant to do equity before receiving
equity.53 Employing this latter concept, the courts have demanded that
the creditor be willing to adjudicate all matters related to his claim in a
summary manner. This approach overlooks the fact that our system has
always recognized a distinction between legal and equitable counterclaims,
whether or not the original claim was equitable in nature.54
Outside the bankruptcy field it has never been held that a plaintiff
waives his right to jury trial on legal counterclaims by instituting an
equitable action.55 It is true that under the premerger practice, the
defendant in an equitable suit who asserted a legal counterclaim arising
out of the plaintiff's original equitable claim 56 waived his right to jury
trial on the counterclaim.57 At the same time, the plaintiff's right to a
jury trial on the legal counterclaim was still recognized.5 8  After the
merger of law and equity, certain changes were effected. It was thought
unfair that a defendant should lose his right to jury trial when filing a
legal counterclaim related to the equitable claim, since the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure compelled him to file the counterclaim.5 9 Although the
courts agreed that the defendant had a right to jury trial on the legal
counterclaim, problems still remained. The basic question the courts
could not resolve was the time at which the right to jury trial attached.
Some courts held that the equitable claim should be tried first and that
62Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390 (10th Cir. 1955), cert.
dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944 (1956).
53 See, e.g., id. at 389; Chase Nat'l Bank v. Lyford, 147 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1945).
54 See American Mills Co. v. American Sur. Co., 260 U.S. 360 (1922); Clifton
v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1927).
55 See ibid. See generally 5 Moo , FEDERAL PRACriCE § 38.14 (2d ed. 1951);
McCord, Right to Jury Trial in the Federal Courts, 45 IowA L. Rxv. 726 (1960).
56 The defendant's right to raise a legal counterclaim in such circumstances is
enunciated in United States v. National City Bank, 83 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 563 (1936).
57 See, e.g., American Mills Co. v. American Sur. Co., 260 U.S. 360, 366 (1922);
Horowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 295, 302 (9th Cir. 1935); Clifton v.
Tomb, 21 F.2d 893, 898 (4th Cir. 1927).
58 See Clifton v. Tomb, supra note 57; National Elec. Prods. Corp. v. Circle
Flexible Conduit Co., 57 F.2d 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1931) ; McCord, supra note 55.
59 See Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Merged Procedures, 65 HAgv. L.
REv. 453 (1952).
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only issues not necessarily determined by the court in passing on the
plaintiff's claim should later be submitted to the jury.60 Other courts
searched for the "basic issue" in the case and decided whether a right
to jury trial existed by determining whether that issue was legal or
equitable.61 Since the determination of either cause constituted collateral
estoppel on common questions of fact in the other cause of action, a de-
cision that the equitable cause be litigated first was for practical purposes
a denial of the right to jury trial.62
In 1959, the Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 6
rendered a decision which greatly limited judicial power to curtail the
right to jury trial. In that case, Fox West Coast Theatres sought a
declaratory judgment that its activities were not in violation of the anti-
trust laws; it also sought an injunction to prevent Beacon Theatres from
instituting antitrust actions. Beacon counterclaimed and asked for treble
damages; it also asked for a jury trial. The district court held that the
issues raised by the complaint for declarative relief were essentially equi-
table and it directed that these issues be tried by a court before jury
determination of the counterclaim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that Beacon Theatres had a right to jury trial on its legal claim for
treble damages. The Court stated:
The justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it obtains
jurisdiction, and refusing to dismiss a case, merely because subse-
quently a legal remedy becomes available, must be re-evaluated in
the light of the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules
which allow legal and equitable causes to be brought and resolved
in one civil action.
On similar facts, the Supreme Court held recently in Dairy Queen v.
Wood 65 that unless there are unusual circumstances in a case involving
both legal and equitable issues, a right to jury trial on the legal issues
can not be lost through a prior determination of the equitable claims. It
was no longer to matter that the equitable cause outweighed the legal cause
and was the basic issue of the case; as long as any legal cause was in-
volved the jury trial rights it created were controlling. 66 These two cases
clearly establish that the party who files the legal counterclaim must be
given a jury trial on the legal issues.
60 See, e.g., Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 81 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
61 See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565
(D. Del. 1949).
62 See Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952).
63 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
64Id. at 509.
65 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
6 6 Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (1961)
(cited with approval in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 n.8 (1962)).
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The situation is somewhat different in the bankruptcy context, since
in most cases the party who desires a jury trial on the counterclaim is
the party who files the equitable claim rather than the party who files
the counterclaim.6 7 Though the Beacon and Dairy Queen courts were not
faced with the question of the plaintiff's right to jury trial, these cases
must also be read to protect that right. There is no doubt that the two
cases have given the right to jury trial a broader interpretation than it
had in premerger days, since the defendant was then held to have waived
his right to jury trial by filing a legal claim. 68 Since the plaintiff had a
right to jury trial on these issues before the merger of law and equity,69
and since the recent Supreme Court decisions do not limit that right, but
extend it to the defendant, it seems reasonable to conclude that the plain-
tiff's right should be protected as it existed in premerger days.
The impact of these recent cases and the analysis set forth above
are applicable to the plaintiffs (creditors) and defendants (trustees) in
bankruptcy proceedings. The more typical 70 counterclaims brought by a
trustee in bankruptcy are legal in nature, and therefore the claimant in such
cases is entitled to a jury trial under the seventh amendment.71 First, those
claims that the trustee may institute because he has acquired the bankrupt's
right 7 range over the broad spectrum of legal and equitable actions, and
thereby include contract and tort actions which are legal in nature. Fur-
thermore, the trustee's right to recover voidable preferences," chattels or
cash held by parties who received the property either in a fraudulent
transfer or by executing and collecting a voidable lien 7 4 are also legal in
nature, since at common law actions of trover and money had and received
were the appropriate actions to recover such property.75 The legal nature
67 See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 380
U.S. 971 (1965).
68 See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
69 See text accompanying note 58 stepra.
70 The bulk of the recent counterclaim cases in the circuit courts has involved
counterclaims for preferences and contractual claims. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy,
336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 380 U.S. 971 (1965) (preference);
Nortex Trading Corp. v. Newfield, 311 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1962) (preference) ; Peters
v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960) (contract); Continental Cas. Co. v. White,
269 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1959) (preference); Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221
F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 350 U.S. 944 (1956) (prefer-
ence) ; Columbia Foundry v. Lochner, 179 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1950) (contract).
71 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
72 Bankruptcy Act §70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1964).7 3 Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 52 Stat 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1964).
74 Bankruptcy Act § 67, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §'107 (1964).
75 See, e.g., Billon v. Hyde, 1 Ves. Sen. 326 (1749) (action of trover by assignees
to recover property preferentially transferred) ; Cooper v. Chitty, 1 Burr. 19, 97
E.R. 166 (1756) (Lord Mansfield) (action of trover against sheriff who had executed
writ of fieri facias against bankrupt) ; Martin v. Pewtress, 4 Burr. 2478, 98 E.R. 299
(1769) (action of trover to recover goods fraudulently transferred) ; Rust v. Cooper,
2 Cowp. 629, 98 E.R. 1277 (1777) (action of trover to recover value of goods fraudu-
lently transferred) ; Smith v. Milles, 1 T.R. 475, 99 E.R. 1205 (1786) (citing Cooper
v. Chitty, supra); Thompson v. Freeman, 1 T.R. 155, 99 E.R. 1026 (1786) (action
of trover to recover goods of which third party took possession after confession of
judgment by bankrupt) ; see cases cited in Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S.
92, 94 n.1 (1932). See generally CooKE, BANKRuPT LAws 322-28 (1786); GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND Par-Xl=NCES §§ 98, 417 (1940).
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of a trustee's suit to recover a preference has been explicitly recognized
by the Supreme Court in Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co.,76 in which the
Court held that the defendant in such an action has a right to jury trial
under the seventh amendment.
It has already been held that a trustee has a right to jury trial on
his legal counterclaim. 77  Since the trustee has this right, there is no
reason why the claimant should not be similarly protected, since the
rationale for extending the right to the defendant in an equitable action
suggests similar treatment for a claimant in bankruptcy proceedings.
One of the primary reasons for protecting the defendant's right to jury
trial after the merger of law and equity, is that the Federal Rules en-
courage joinder of causes in one action 7 and compel the defendant to
counterclaim in certain circumstances. 79 This compulsion rationale applies
equally well to the claimant in bankruptcy, since the latter can initiate
proceedings to recover on his claim only by filing in the bankruptcy court.
If the creditor does not file, the only other possible way he can collect his
claim is to wait for the trustee to institute plenary proceedings against
him. This assumes, however, that the creditor is aware of the trustee's
claim and that the trustee will in fact try to recover it. Thus, for all
practical purposes, the creditor is under a similar compulsion to file his
claim as the defendant (or trustee) is to counterclaim in equitable proceed-
ings. If the creditor is forced to waive his right to jury trial by filing
a claim in the only tribunal which has power to hear it, this would, in
effect, be putting a price on using the federal courts, which seems to raise
serious due process problems. The compulsion rationale, coupled with
the premerger practice of safeguarding the equitable claimant's right to
jury trial on legal counterclaims and colored by the Supreme Court's
present rigid position on the right to jury trial, strongly suggests the
adoption of a procedure which will allow the claimant in bankruptcy to
secure a jury trial on the counterclaim.
Another argument for ending the "consent by filing" doctrine may
be made on the basis of Rules 38 and 39 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 0 Rule 38(b) states that a demand for jury trial on an issue
may be asserted within ten days after the last pleading to such issue. Rule
38(d) provides that a failure to serve a demand constitutes a waiver of
jury trial. The rule further states that "a demand for trial by jury . . .
may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties." Moreover,
Rule 39(a) provides that:
76 287 U.S. 92 (1932).
77 See Black v. Boyd, 248 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1957).
78 See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (permitting joinder of all claims whether legal or
equitable).
79 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
8o0F. P CIrv. P. 38(a) provides: "The right of trial by jury as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United
States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."
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when trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38,
the action shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action.
The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1)
the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation
filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court
and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting
without a jury ....
These rules are so explicit that it seems likely that Congress intended to
limit waiver of jury trial to cases where there was either a failure to
demand jury trial or a written or oral consent to trial without a jury.
Thus, implied consent to waiver would not be an available doctrine. The
fact that Rule 39(a) (2) permits a court to find that a right to jury trial
does not exist under the Constitution or statutes of the United States 81
does not disturb the validity of the preceding analysis. In the first place,
the circuit courts have not contended that the creditor has no right to jury
trial on legal counterclaims, they merely argue that he waives this right
by filing his claim. Furthermore, as demonstrated above, there seems to
be no doubt that an equitable claimant has a right to jury trial on legal
counterclaims.
In light of the jury trial issue, the circuit courts' collateral estoppel
rationale for allowing summary jurisdiction of related legal counterclaims
seems untenable. As mentioned above, the circuit courts have emphasized
the trustee's right to have a summary adjudication of the issues upon which
his counterclaim is based if these issues are raised in answer to the credi-
tor's claim. From this, the courts have concluded that a plenary pro-
ceeding would only be a wasteful expenditure of time, since the issues
raised in the summary proceeding would be collateral estoppel in the
plenary proceedings.82 Even if the objections noted above to this ap-
proach 83 are not accepted, the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen rule still
outweighs the collateral estoppel policy. In the Beacon Theatres case, the
facts on which Beacon based its counterclaim-that Fox West Coast
Theatres and Beacon were competitors and that the clearance period be-
tween Beacon and Fox was reasonable-would also have been sufficient
to constitute a defense to Fox's equitable claim. However, the entire
impact of Beacon Theatres was its support for the general proposition that
lower courts should not disregard the right to jury trial on the strength of
technical distinctions. The Court in that case carefully emphasized that
81FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a) (2) provides:
The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless . . . (2) the
court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury
of some or all of those issues does not exist under the Constitution or statutes
of the United States.
82 See, e.g., li re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied sub nor., Marine Midland Trust Co. v. McGirl, 345 U.S. 940 (1953).
83 See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
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"maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care." 84 This strong defense of the right to jury trial 8 estab-
lishes a constitutionally based policy strong enough to subordinate the
competing and somewhat disfavored policy of collateral estoppel.8 6 More-
over, since the trustee has a duty to recover adversely held claims for the
bankrupt estate, 7 the collateral estoppel policy should carry no weight
in bankruptcy proceedings. Allowing the trustee to plead as a defense
facts sufficient to state a cause of action would merely permit him to pre-
vent a claimant from acquiring a jury trial on this cause of action.
Conclusion
The validity of the circuit courts' position on waiver of jury trial
is presently before the Supreme Court in Katchen v. Landy s8 certiorari
having been granted. If the Court continues its strong protection of the
right to jury trial in this case, a different procedure will have to be chosen
for future counterclaim cases in the bankruptcy court. One possible alterna-
tive is adoption of the procedure employed by the Fifth Circuit,89 which
does not follow the "consent by filing" doctrine. Under this approach,
the creditor's claim is left pending before the referee, and the trustee is
ordered to prosecute the plenary suit to establish his cause of action on
the counterclaim. It should be noted that in the Fifth Circuit case estab-
lishing this procedure the counterclaim was based upon the theory that the
creditor had received a voidable preference.
The Fifth Circuit procedure compels the trustee to go through all
the formalities of instituting a suit. Process must be served, a complaint
must be filed, and other technicalities must be satisfied. Moreover, under
section 23, the trustee may also be forced to bring the suit in a state court,
if there is no diversity of citizenship.9 0 Thus, the trustee may be able to
recover the preference from the creditor only after successfully prosecuting
a state court determination of the issue in a plenary proceeding with a
jury trial.9 ' Completion of this lengthy process would be required before
84 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (quoting Dimick
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
85 See also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Corp., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)
(federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions outweighs policy
of Erie v. Tompkins).
86 See generally Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
87 Bankruptcy Act § 47, 52 Stat. 860 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1964).
88 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 380 U.S. 971 (1965).
89 See B. F. Avery & Sons v. Davis, 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 945 (1952).
90 Bankruptcy Act §23, 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §46 (1964).
91 See ibid.; Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1924);
O'Dell v. United States, 326 F.2d 451, 455 (10th Cir. 1964) ; In re Prima, 98 F2d
952, 957 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1938).
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the referee could finally adjudicate the creditor's claim, which would be
held pending during the state court trial. The expenditure of time re-
quired by this procedure explains why most courts have been willing to
imply consent to summary jurisdiction when a creditor files his claim.
If the trustee's counterclaim were not based upon a preference or other
section 57(g) type issue,9 2 there would seem to be no reason for holding
the creditor's claim pending before the referee. His claim could be adjudi-
cated and the trustee could simultaneously prosecute his action in a plenary
proceeding. Even this procedure, however, would be cumbersome and
time consuming, and most of the issues litigated in the summary proceed-
ing would have to be relitigated in the plenary proceeding.
A more expeditious alternative has been suggested by the Second
Circuit in Kleid v. Ruthbell Coal Co.9 3 The court permitted the creditor
in that case to withdraw his claim when the trustee alleged in defense
that the creditor had received a voidable preference. The creditor's
withdrawal was conditioned, however, on his consenting: (1) to the district
court having subject matter jurisdiction, (2) to accept summons, and (3)
to the early setting of a trial date. This procedure retains the good points
of the present system employed by the circuit courts, while maintaining
the claimant's right to a jury trial on the trustee's counterclaim. By con-
ditioning the procedure on the claimant's consent to federal jurisdiction,
no speed of administration is lost, since federal courts generally have
docket delays similar to those in state courts.9 Moreover, both the cred-
itor's claim and the trustee's counterclaim will be litigated in one proceeding.
This procedure is thus a more reasonable method of implementing the
creditor's right to jury trial than that of the Fifth Circuit.
The Kleid solution, however, is inadequate in two situations. It
cannot be employed if the creditor does not wish to withdraw his
claim and is also useless where the trustee counterclaims, rather than
merely defending on the preference theory. The problem in this latter
situation is that Rule 41(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
does not allow the withdrawal of a claim after a counterclaim has been
made unless the counterclaim alone can be adjudicated in the court in
which it was made. The court circumvented this problem in Kleid by
classifying the trustee's objection to the claim on the voidable preference
theory as an affirmative defense rather than a counterclaim.
There is, however, a third alternative which would avoid these prob-
lems and would be satisfactory in most cases: if the creditor makes a
92Bankruptcy Act §57(g), 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §93(g) (1964)
provides:
The claims of creditors who have received or acquired preferences, liens,
conveyances, transfers, assignments or encumbrances, void or voidable under
this Act, shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender such
preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or encumbrances.
93 131 F2d 372 (2d Cir. 1942).
94 See generally 328 THE ANNALs OF THE AmEIcAN AcADEmY OF PoLrrIcAL
AND SocrAL ScIENcE 7-28 (1960).
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demand for jury trial and for plenary proceedings after the trustee counter-
claims, the court would set the entire action for adjudication in a federal
court with a jury trial. The possible problem with this alternative is that
if there is no diversity of citizenship, the creditor may refuse consent to
have the counterclaim adjudicated in a federal court and insist that the
cause of action be instituted in a state court.95
In sum, all three procedures discussed above have deficiencies, and
only the cumbersome procedure of the Fifth Circuit falls clearly within
the statute. Thus a complete solution to all the problems must lie in a
congressional amendment of the Bankruptcy Act giving the federal courts
jurisdiction even over counterclaims which concern property not in the
actual or constructive possession of the trustee. Such a change would
require a creditor faced with a counterclaim to adjudicate both it and his
original claim in the federal court, while still receiving a jury trial if he
so demanded.
95This Comment has not discussed whether the bankruptcy court could imply
consent to federal jurisdiction from the creditor's filing of his claim, it has only
assumed that even if consent to federal jurisdiction could be implied, consent to sum-
mary proceedings on the counterclaim or waiver of jury trial could not be. If a
court did grant the claimant plenary proceedings and a jury trial, then implying
consent to federal jurisdiction would not be unreasonable. However, since the Bank-
ruptcy Act only gives the bankruptcy court jurisdiction when it has actual or con-
structive possession of the property sought to be recovered, it would seem inconsistent
to imply such consent. The quasi in rein analogy also seems to support the position
that consent to federal jurisdiction cannot be implied. See note 42 supra.
